Bargaining over Environmental Budgets: A Political Economy Model with Application to French Water Policy by Thomas, Alban & Zaporozhets, Vera
 TSE‐579
	
“Bargaining	over	Environmental	Budgets:	A	Political	
Economy	Model	with	Application	to	French	Water	Policy”	
	
	
A.	Thomas	and	V.	Zaporozhets	
May	2015
Bargaining over Environmental Budgets: A Political Economy1
Model with Application to French Water Policy2
3
1 Introduction4
Environmental decision makers often rely on consultative committees or legislative boards5
for budget allocation issues. There is a growing literature on the properties of environmen-6
tal planning systems in which such governance implies negotiation between stakeholders.7
Negotiation and bargaining models are for example applied to pollution control problem8
(Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Van Egteren and Tang, 1997; Wang et al., 2003), agree-9
ments on greenhouse gas mitigation (Weikard, 2010; Lessmann et al., 2015), management10
of global biodiversity (Gatti et al., 2011), the choice of environmental policy instruments11
under strategic voting (Hattori, 2010), and water issues (Carraro and Sgobbi, 2011 and the12
survey by Carraro et al., 2005). Indeed, the management of water resources is an interesting13
and important example: in many countries, management is decentralized at the river basin14
(or water district) level, and water users are represented in consultative committees while15
contributing to a common budget through a tax policy.16
More precisely, in such institutional setting, a budget raised from water use charges or17
emission taxes is redistributed between resource users public funding of projects of general or18
categorical interest, under a balanced budget restriction. Because of the diversity of services19
provided by water to residential users, industry, agriculture and ecosystems, the range of20
projects financed by environmental agencies is potentially large, as well as the diversity of21
tax revenues. The rules under which the redistribution takes place are an important part22
of the environmental policy and their relevance for environmental protection is a matter of23
environmental political economy. Such water management systems with earmarked budgets24
and local water boards (or river basin committees) are found in several countries such as25
Belgium, France, Italy, Mexico, Portugal and Spain (OECD, 2011).26
It should not be surprising that there are winners and losers from such budget distribu-27
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tion, as the intensity of water use and the nature of resource and environmental projects28
potentially financed vary largely over user categories. Nevertheless, from a purely redis-29
tributive perspective, water users may oppose excessive differences between the level of tax30
payments and subsidies they receive, particularly in contexts where subsidies are aimed at31
promoting water-saving and emission abatement projects, precisely to reduce the burden of32
tax. This is precisely the case in France, where taxes are collected by Water Agencies on33
water use and effluent emissions from three major user categories: residential users, industry34
and agriculture, and are then used to finance specific or general-interest projects for resource35
conservation or availability. By doing so, Water Agencies are applying a principle of “river36
basin solidarity” among water users, which is part of the French Water Law since 1964. Re-37
cently however, the French audit office has questioned the functioning of the Water Agencies38
(Cour des Comptes, 2015). One of the main critiques is that there is a persistent imbalance39
between the amount of taxes paid and the subsidies received by the different categories of40
water users, agriculture being always favoured by the system.41
Although the observed discrepancies between relative tax payments and subsidies can42
be explained by the relative weights of water user categories in committees, the negotiation43
process within committees can also play an important part. More precisely, the nature of44
coalition formation in water boards may be an additional factor to explain observed gaps45
between tax payments and subsidies. Moreover, water user representatives may find it46
preferable to bargain over a fraction of the budget only, so as to secure a predetermined47
share of the budget in the form of subsidies.48
To determine whether the nature of bargaining and coalition formation within commit-49
tees, as well as the possibility to secure a fixed part of the budget from bargaining, play a50
role in final decisions from water boards, a specific model is called for. The contribution51
of this paper is twofold. First, we model the negotiation process within a water board as52
a noncooperative bargaining game where players include representatives of water users and53
the State. An important aspect when considering a model of bargaining applied to water54
management decisions, is the fact that the latter may not reflect the observed distribution of55
water user representatives in the water boards. Indeed, a representative may need to form56
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a coalition with other user representatives, to make sure his proposal will be accepted. A57
major determinant is therefore the weight each category has in the committee, as well as the58
probability that a particular representative will have the initiative to make a proposal upon59
the budget to be distributed. Another particular aspect of our bargaining model is the fact60
that representatives negotiate, not only over the share of budget to be distributed among61
water user categories, but also on the fraction of the budget that will be bargained upon,62
hence leading to a two-stage game. It is likely that, because of risk aversion and preferences63
for stability over time of budget shares, representatives in water boards prefer to exclude a64
fixed proportion of the budget from bargaining.65
Second, we perform a structural estimation of the bargaining model, with an application66
to the French water policy. In the special case with three water user categories characterized67
by Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences, we show that a closed-form solution68
exists and that there is a systematic gain for water users associated with a particularly69
low share of total tax payments. Our structural estimation includes preference parameters70
and the share of budget that is bargained upon. We test whether our assumptions on71
the two-stage structure of the game are valid, i.e., whether bargaining occurs over the full72
budget or not at all. Furthermore, we compare our structural estimation with reduced-form73
estimates that only predict budget shares without imposing any particular assumption on74
the negotiation process. A non-nested test procedure is used to compare the structural75
model estimation with reduced-form estimation, as in the empirical literature on bargaining76
models that does not go beyond identification of major determinants of budget allocation,77
i.e., representative power and/or economic “needs” as in Kauppi and Widgren (2004).78
We are also able to examine the impact of the nature of the negotiation process over the79
final budget distribution, as structural estimates can be used to derive probabilities for water80
user representatives to act as proposers of particular budget distributions. In particular, such81
estimated probabilities may be different from observed representation of water users in water82
boards, which may form an additional factor for explaining tax-subsidy gaps for some water83
user categories.84
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the bargaining model in the85
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general case of a water board (or river basin committee) with water user representatives. We86
adopt a game-theoretical approach consisting of two stages: determination of the optimal87
share of budget to be bargained upon, and computation of the equilibrium payoffs from88
negotiation between players over the distribution of the residual budget.89
In Section 3, we consider the French Water Agencies and River Basin Committees as a90
particularly relevant application. We first show that, in the special case of three water user91
categories, closed-form solutions to the bargaining game are available. This case matches well92
the actual situation with residential users, agriculture and industry as the major categories93
concerned by the water policy. We then briefly discuss the French water policy and present94
the data, before proceeding to structural model estimation. We test for the assumption that95
budget is either not bargained upon (and relative budget shares correspond to tax shares), or96
whether the full budget is subject to bargaining. Rejection of these assumptions provides us97
with evidence that a two-stage model with bargaining over partial budget is valid. Finally,98
we compare our structural estimation with a reduced-form system of equations and use a99
non-nested test procedure to discriminate between the two approaches. Section 4 concludes.100
2 The Bargaining Model101
In this section we introduce the bargaining model applied to water management by a water102
board (or river basin committee). We assume that the tax policy is predetermined, and we103
focus on the distribution of the budget raised from taxes among user categories in terms104
of subsidies. A convenient representation is to consider a sequential bargaining game with105
two stages, because it embeds a majority of actual situations possibly as special cases (no106
bargaining, bargaining over full budget or a fraction of the budget). In the first stage, players107
bargain on the fraction of the budget to be distributed proportionally to the taxes paid by108
the different categories. In the second stage, players bargain on the allocation of the residual109
budget among user categories.110
The theoretical papers closest to our setting are Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Banks111
and Duggan (2001), hereafter denoted BF and BD respectively. As in BF, we assume that112
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the policy consists in the distribution of a budget among a set of users. Their bargaining113
game consists in a (possibly infinite) sequence of stages where at each stage a proposer is114
selected to make a proposal which is submitted to a vote. If a winning coalition of players115
vote in favor of the proposal, then the game ends with the proposal implemented.116
Also in line with BF, we consider a first stage with a (possibly infinite) sequence of117
rounds: at each round a proposer is selected to make a proposal which is submitted to vote.118
If a winning coalition of players vote in favor of the proposal then the game ends and the119
first stage is completed. The relevant bargaining model is the general BD model which120
considers arbitrary unidimensional or multidimensional policy spaces. In our second stage,121
we are back in the policy situation considered by BF but, for the sake of tractability, instead122
of modelling the second stage as BF did, we model it as an ultimatum game (one round123
instead of a sequence of rounds).124
When solving the two-stage game backwards, the reduced game we obtain is therefore125
a BD game in which players have rationally anticipated their payoffs in the continuation126
game. More precisely, given the budget fraction proposed in stage 1 and the residual budget127
distributed in stage 2, players can calculate their random shares in stage 2. This amounts128
to calculating the chance of being a proposer and the chance of being listed in a proposal129
initiated by another proposer. By accepting to go for stage 2, players endorse a risk as130
the outcome of stage 2 is not known with certainty. In stage 1, their attitude towards risk131
combined with their characteristics as tax contributors therefore determine their indirect132
utility for future random payoffs. We will therefore obtain a one dimensional BD bargaining133
problem, along the lines discussed above.1134
1Several empirical analyses of the BF bargaining model have been conducted, including Knight (2005)
on decisions of the US House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Ferejohn (1974) and Lewitt
and Poterba (1999) on federal spending and representation by congressional delegations, Eraslan (2008)
on bargaining in the BF vein in corporate finance, and Diermeier and Merlo (2004) on the analysis of the
formation of coalition governments in Europe.
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2.1 Basic Setting135
We assume there are n committee members (also referred to as ”players”), from which k136
are representatives of water user categories, i = 1, . . . , k, with k ≤ n. Non-water users,137
j = k + 1, . . . , n, are stakeholders not directly impacted by committee decisions on budget.138
We denote by γi the fraction of total taxes paid by the ith category of users:139
γi =
ti
k∑
j=1
tj
, (1)
where ti is the amount of taxes paid by the ith category of users. We assume, without140
loss of generality, that γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ · · · ≤ γk.141
The committee members decide on the distribution of the budget, normalized to 1 without142
loss of generality, among the k users. The policy space is X ≡
{
x ∈ Rk+ :
∑k
i=1 xi = 1
}
,143
where xi denotes the budget share for user i. Water user representatives are assumed to be144
concerned exclusively by their own budget share. In contrast, preferences of other (non-user)145
committee members can possibly concern the welfare of all k categories of users. We assume146
that each player j = k + 1, . . . , n assigns a weight βij to user category i, i = 1...k, such that147
for any j = k + 1, . . . , n and i = 1, . . . , k, βij ∈ [0, 1] and
∑k
i=1 βij = 1. Then, given the148
vector of shares x = (x1, ..., xk) the utility of player j, j = k + 1, . . . , n, is149
uj (x) =
k∑
i=1
βijui(xi), (2)
where ui is a twice continuously differentiable function such that u
′
i > 0 and u
′′
i < 0. We150
refer to the case where all vectors βj = (β1j, . . . , βkj), j = 1, . . . , n have their coordinates151
equal to 0 except one as the corner regime.152
Players act both as voters and as proposers. The voting activity is described by a weighted153
majority game. Let qi denote the voting weight (the number of representatives) of category i.154
We assume that all other voters have weight equal to 1. The quotaQ of the game could be any155
number between
⌊
(
∑k
i=1 qi)+(n−k)
2
⌋
2 and
(∑k
i=1 qi
)
+(n−k). Therefore, our framework allows156
2For any real number x, bxc denotes the smallest integer greater than x.
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for a wide range of voting mechanisms. When Q =
⌊
(
∑k
i=1 qi)+(n−k)
2
⌋
, to pass the proposal157
the approval of the majority of members is necessary, while when Q =
(∑k
i=1 qi
)
+ (n− k),158
unanimity is required. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that Q is the majority quota.159
We denote by W (Wm) the set of winning (minimal winning) coalitions.3160
The distribution of proposal powers is represented by the vector p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) such161
that pi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., n, and
∑n
i=1 pi = 1, where pi denotes the probability that player162
i is in charge of making a proposal.163
The game has two stages. The first stage is a BD bargaining game on the fraction,164
denoted α, of the budget distributed proportionally to tax payments. This is a sequential165
game with a possibly infinite number of rounds. At each round t, a proposer i(t) is selected166
and makes a proposal α(i, t), which members of the committee may approve or reject. If the167
subset of members approving the proposal is a winning coalition, the proposal is adopted,168
and if not, the game moves to round t + 1 and the procedure is repeated. If the procedure169
fails, γ is adopted.170
If α = 1 is selected, the game ends after the first stage and the whole budget is distributed171
according to γ. However, if α < 1 is selected, then there is a second stage during which172
players negotiate on the distribution of the residual budget (1− α). To keep things simple,173
instead of considering an infinite game as in the first stage, we model the second stage as an174
ultimatum (one-stage) game. A proposer i is selected according to the probability vector p175
to make a proposal x(i) ∈ X which can be accepted or not by other players. If the subset of176
players approving the proposal is a winning coalition, it is adopted, otherwise, the vector γ177
is adopted for the residual budget.178
We solve this sequential game backwards, and in the following subsection we proceed179
with the description of the second stage of the game.180
3A coalition S is a winning one if and only if
∑
i∈S qi ≥ Q. If, moreover, by dropping any player j we
reverse the inequality, i.e.,
∑
i∈S\{j} qi < Q for any j ∈ S, then such a coalition S is called minimal winning.
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2.2 Second Stage: Distribution of Residual Budget181
The outcome of the second stage is the allocation of residual budget (1− α) among categories182
of users. Nature draws proposer j with probability pj ≥ 0, where
∑n
j=1 pj = 1.183
Proposer j selects vector xj = {x1j, x2j, . . . , xkj} ∈ Rk+ such that
∑k
i=1 xij = (1− α).4 We184
denote by Sα such simplex. If a majority of members votes in favor of the proposal, the185
proposal is adopted. Otherwise, the proposal is defeated and the default option γ is used to186
allocate the residual fraction of the budget. In what follows we describe the voting response.187
Voter l votes for the proposal xj if and only if188
ul (αγ + xj) ≥ ul (γ) . (3)
We assume that ties are broken in favor of the proposer.189
For the proposal to be accepted, the proposer should consider the cost of “buying” a190
minimal winning coalition. Letting S be any such coalition, the problem of proposer j can191
be written as:192
max
xj∈Sα
uj (αγ + xj) , such that ul (αγ + xj) ≥ ul (γ) for all l ∈ S\ {j} . (4)
Let us denote by C(α, S, j) the value of this problem and193
C(α, j) ≡ max
S∈Wm
C(α, S, j). (5)
We also denote by x∗j (α) for j = 1...n the optimal solution to problem (4) and we proceed194
as if this solution were unique.195
Let us look at the solution for the corner regime under complete information. In such196
a case, each player j, j = k + 1, ..., n acts in favour of a single user group. Letting Mi (mi)197
denote the group (the number) of representatives in the set {k + 1, ..., n} acting for user i,198
we have
∑k
i=1mi = n− k.199
In such a case, players voting on behalf of category i have weight equal to wi = qi +mi.200
Further, the set of supporters of category i votes in favor of the proposal if and only if201
xi ≥ γi (1− α) . (6)
4The component xij is the share of the budget offered to player i by proposer j.
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Things are as if proposer j representing category i makes a proposal to win the votes of a202
winning coalition in a weighted majority game with {1, 2, ..., k} as the set of players and wi203
being the weight of player i. The probability of player i to be selected as a proposer is now204
equal to:205
p̂i = pi +
∑
j∈Mi
pj. (7)
The set of (minimal) winning coalitions of this simple game is denoted by (Ŵm) Ŵ .206
We have,207
C(α, S, j) = (1− α)−
∑
i∈S\{j}
γi (1− α) = (1− α)
1− ∑
i∈S\{j}
γi
 , (8)
and therefore,208
C(α, j) = (1− α) (1− min
S∪{j}∈Ŵm
∑
i∈S\{j}
γi). (9)
Equivalently in this case:209
C(α, j) = (1− α)
1− min
S∪{j}∈Ŵm
∑
i∈S\{j}
γi
 . (10)
To obtain a closed-form expression for x∗ij (voter i’s equilibrium share when j is the210
proposer) is difficult in the general case, even under our assumption of corner regime, because211
for any player i, there is a trade-off between the voting weight wi and the cost reflected by212
the reservation value γi.213
2.3 First Stage: Decision on Fixed Part of Budget214
The first stage is a one-dimensional BD bargaining game , once we account for the backward215
solution of the second stage on the residual budget allocation, vector x∗j (α) for all j, j =216
1, ..., n. In the first stage of the game, each player i views the choice of α as the choice in a217
lottery where he receives a prize equal to x∗ij (α) with probability pj.218
The expected utility Vi (α) of player i is equal to:219
n∑
j=1
pjui
(
αγi + x
∗
ij (α)
)
. (11)
9
Note that when j 6= i, player i’s equilibrium share x∗ij is either equal to 0 or to (1− α) γi.
The player’s expected utility is therefore based on two numbers: first, the probability denoted
by Pi that i is considered in the continuation game when i is not the proposer himself, and
second, the coalition Si of players who receive a positive share in his proposal. Without
loss of generality, we assume that Si does not contain player i. Player i’s share xi can be
expressed as:
xi =

αγi + (1− α)
(
1−∑j∈Si γj) = γi + (1− α)∑j∈N\(Si∪{i}) γj with probability p̂i,
γi with probability Pi,
αγi with probability 1− p̂i − Pi.
We obtain that:
Vi (α) = p̂iui
γi + (1− α) ∑
j∈N\(Si∪{i})
γj
+ Piui (γi)
220
+(1− p̂i − Pi)ui (αγi) . (12)
From our assumptions on ui, it follows that V
′′
i (α) < 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1], i.e., func-221
tion V ′′i (α) is strictly concave on the unit interval. We denote by α
∗
i the (unique) peak for222
player i. Since all assumptions of Banks and Duggan (2000) are met, we conclude from223
their results that if all players are perfectly patient, then the equilibrium outcomes of the224
game coincide with the core and it is equal to the median value α∗ of the vector (α∗1, . . . , α
∗
n).
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225
226
The following proposition summarizes the properties displayed by the preferred peaks of227
the different groups.228
229
Proposition 1 Assume that the utility function ui (xi) is such that ui (0) = 0, u
′
i > 0,230
u′′i ≤ 0, then V ′′i (α) ≤ 0 on [0, 1] for any i, i = 1, ..., k.231
Moreover, there exist threshold values γ
i
and γi such that 0 ≤ γ
i
< γi and:232
5This result implies that if n is odd, then the equilibrium is unique. However, if n is even, there is no
single middle value, and the median is then can be defined as the mean of the two middle values.
10
(i) if 0 ≤ γi ≤ γi Vi (α) is decreasing on the whole interval [0, 1];233
(ii) if γ
i
<γi < γi Vi (α) has a unique maximum on the interval (0, 1) and it is defined234
from the equation V ′i (α) = 0;235
(iii) if γi ≥ γi Vi (α) is increasing on the whole interval [0, 1].236
The thresholds γi and γi are calculated as:237
γi =
p̂i
∑
j∈N\(Si∪{i}) γj
1− p̂i − Pi (13)
and238
γ
i
=
p̂iu
′
i
(∑
j∈N\Si γj
)∑
j∈N\(Si∪{i}) γj
(1− p̂i − Pi)u′i(0)
. (14)
Proof: see Appendix 1.239
240
Part (i) of Proposition 1 states that any player i with relatively low γi, i.e., with γi below241
γ
i
, prefers to bargain on the whole budget as his preferred α∗i = 0. The reason is that in the242
bargaining game, player i expects to get more than he obtains under the mechanical rule,243
i.e., γi. Being a “cheap” coalitional partner, he is included in any coalition when he is not a244
proposer receiving an offer equal to γi. When he is a proposer he gets strictly more than γi.245
On the contrary, part (iii) of the proposition states that any player i with relatively high246
γi, i.e., with γi above γi, prefers to share the whole budget according to the mechanical247
rule as his preferred α∗i = 1. The reason is that in the bargaining game, player i being an248
“expensive” coalitional partner receives no offer when he is not a proposer.249
Part (ii) describes an intermediate case: any player i with intermediate value of γi, i.e.,250
with γi in between γi and γi, would like to bargain upon some part of the budget as his251
α∗i ∈ (0, 1).252
3 Application253
We apply in this section the bargaining model to budget allocation decisions by French Water254
Agencies, as an interesting example of decentralized water management with negotiation255
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between water user representatives in river basin committees. The ability to obtain closed-256
form solutions from Proposition 1 derives from an reasonable assumption about the number257
of users as a special case, which will prove useful in our application.258
We first introduce the French water policy, and then discuss relevance of our bargaining259
model to this special case of environmental management. We then present the data used260
in the empirical application and introduce the special case of three user categories to derive261
an estimable system of structural equations. The structural estimation results are presented262
and compared with reduced-form estimation, including a non-nested test procedure. We also263
test for special cases where α∗ = 0 and α∗ = 1, corresponding to the case of bargaining over264
full budget and the no-bargaining case respectively.265
3.1 Water Policy and Budget Bargaining: The French Water Agen-266
cies267
Water Agencies in France are at the core of a decentralized water management system at268
the river basin level, and play as such an essential role in the French water policy since the269
mid-1960s. The six Water Agencies (Adour-Garonne, Artois-Picardie, Loire-Bretagne, Rhin-270
Meuse, Rhoˆne-Me´diterrane´e-Corse and Seine-Normandie) can be considered environmental271
agencies in charge of preserving water resources, both in volume and in quality. French272
Water Agencies are financing specific- or commun-interest water-related projects from a273
budget fueled by a variety of water charges and taxes (see Seroa da Motta et al., 2004). This274
includes emission taxes according to the Polluter-Payer Principle and water use taxes and,275
in terms of project funding, direct subsidies, low-interest or zero-interest rate loans.276
Following the Water Act of 2006, the French Parliament determines the priorities of a277
multi-year intervention program of Water Agencies together with a ceiling on their budget.278
Furthermore, the executive board of Water Agencies, composed of a subset of River Basin279
Committee (RBC) members, decides upon the budget allocation following deliberations of280
the corresponding RBC.281
Users are represented in a RBC that also include nominated representatives of the local282
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and national administration. RBCs are the expression of the decentralized management of283
the resource by river basin, and are as such often considered the parliament of the river basin,284
with the Water Agency the executive body in charge of implementing the water policy. River285
Basin Committees participate to the design of multi-year intervention programs, they deter-286
mine the major priorities of the Water Agencies, and they vote on the tax basis and emission287
tax rates. They also discuss the budget allocation for financing local projects regarding water288
resources. The government determines the number of Basin Committee members, including289
the representation of each category of users (agriculture, tourism, industry, etc.) There are,290
by law and in every RBC, 40 percent of members for local communities, 40 percent for user291
representatives, and 20 percent for representatives of the State. Representatives from the292
agricultural sector are typically more numerous in River Basin Committees characterized by293
a higher agricultural activity (Adour-Garonne and Loire-Bretagne).294
In practice, an internal subsidy commission consisting of members of the RBC makes295
recommendations on subsidies to finance water-related projects. The executive board of the296
Water Agency deliberates on the general conditions for attribution of subsidies, and on the297
actual granting of subsidies. A proposal is constructed by the executive board and submitted298
for approval to the River Basin Committee. If it is not accepted by the latter, a new proposal299
is constructed by taking (some of) the recommendations of the River Basin Committee, until300
an agreement is reached.301
A series of papers have addressed the issue of bargaining over water rights or budgets302
under the French water policy. Thoyer et al. (2001) and Simon et al. (2006) apply a mul-303
tilateral, multi-issues bargaining model to analyze negotiations over issues related to water304
use, water storage capacity and user prices. In their general setting, the policy decision has305
several dimensions and there are several players including water users as well as environ-306
mental groups and representatives of elected local councils. Because their model does not307
admit closed-form solutions, the authors simulate the model in order to analyze the impact308
of bargaining power and user heterogeneity among others on the negotiated agreement. As309
in our setting, these studies highlight the role of the bargaining power and the asymmetries310
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of the disagreement payoffs.6311
Concerning the motivation for a two-stage game, where α is selected in the first stage and312
the residual budget is bargained upon in the second stage, there is evidence that members313
of RBCs are in favour of controlling the degree of uncertainty on the final budget allocation.314
First, it is reasonable to assume that members of RBCs prefer to avoid sharp changes in315
budget allocation one year to the next. Second, risk aversion is likely to play a role in the316
objective of water users to bargain over a residual budget, once a non-random part of the317
latter is decided upon.318
There are various ways to define the stable part of budget: stationary over time, or as a319
function of observed and predetermined variables such as tax payments. This is this second320
possibility that we consider here; water users collectively determine the share of budget321
allocated according to their relative tax burden, and then they bargain over deviations from322
this simple and “equitable” rule.323
Interviews with Water Agency executives and RBC members reveal that their policy is324
to maintain a reasonable stability in subsidies granted to water user categories from one325
year to the next. Although there is no formal rule about such trend, this is an indication326
that a proportion of the budget is decided upon as a reference point, independently from327
a subsequent discussion about projects to be financed. Such reference point is difficult to328
evaluate in practice because it is determined after negotiation among representatives within329
each RBC. However, it is reasonable to assume that this proportion of the budget is related330
to tax payments of each user category, because the total tax paid by users is decided upon by331
River Basin Committees in advance for the full multi-year programme and is not renegotiated332
until the next programme.333
An interesting feature of our model is that it includes as special cases the absence of bar-334
gaining (equivalent to α = 1) and bargaining over the full budget (when α = 0). Therefore,335
these two polar cases can be considered equivalent to a situation in which the outcome of336
the bargaining game corresponds to a one-stage game.337
6In our setting, a difference is that the disagreement payoffs correspond to the relative amount of taxes
paid.
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3.2 Data338
For each of the six French Water Agencies, we collect yearly data on tax payments and339
subsidies by user category, as well as on the composition of the six River Basin Committees,340
from 1987 to 2007.341
Water users are paying taxes according to their contribution to water extraction and use,342
and effluent emissions. Taxes include the following categories: urban and industrial wastew-343
ater effluent emissions, agricultural point source emissions (livestock), nonpoint source emis-344
sions, residential and industrial water withdrawals and net consumption, and irrigation water345
abstraction.346
Note that residential users pay emission and water consumption taxes not directly to the347
Water Agency, but through the local community’s water utility. Local communities also pay348
taxes for municipal water use and emission, but this is in a large majority of cases a typically349
small proportion of taxes transferred by local communities to the Water Agency.350
Subsidies granted by Water Agencies are mostly devoted to infrastructure building and351
operating costs of abatement by private agents or local communities. They include munici-352
pal wastewater treatment plants, wastewater networks, operational and technical assistance,353
refuse recycling for local communities; industrial pollution abatement plants, operational354
and technical assistance for industry; point- and nonpoint-source pollution abatement for355
agriculture; water resource management, restoration of aquatic areas, restoration of drink-356
ing water sources for ecosystems. Symmetrically to the fact that residential water users357
do not pay taxes directly, they do not receive direct subsidies, which are granted to local358
communities instead.359
The proportion of subsidies received by each user category (agriculture, industry, resi-360
dential users) is computed for each river basin and each multi-year intervention programme.7361
7Subsidy figures from Water Agencies are detailed by final user but, from a non-budgetary point of view,
there may be indirect beneficiaries to projects. For example, abatement projects for livestock farmers may
be beneficial in terms of raw water quality to residential users ; extension of a water distribution network
may benefit industrial plants within city bounds, etc. We acknowledge this can be a source of bias which
cannot be corrected given available data, but from a strictly budgetary point of view, final beneficiaries from
15
Although emission and water-use tax rates as well as subsidy rates are defined over the362
period of five-year intervention programs for each Water Agency, the relative taxes and363
subsidies paid by each user category are not constant because of yearly applications for364
project funding, and because of yearly changes in the level of economic activity of water365
users (impacting tax revenues).366
Regarding the number of representatives in River Basin Committees, we compute the367
proportion of each category of users (with a particular focus on agriculture and industry)368
with respect to the size of the entire committee, and with respect to the number of user369
representatives (agriculture, industry, tourism, fisheries, angling, energy producers, etc.),370
excluding in that case representatives of the administration not paying water taxes and not371
receiving subsidies. Note that for residential users, there are two possible types of represen-372
tatives: from water consumers (consumer associations, etc.) and from local communities,373
the latter possibly representing other water users. This is also true for farmers, who are374
represented by specific professional members in the RBCs, but whose interests may also be375
represented by representatives of rural communities. We assume that this is the case for376
farmers, but it is not possible to single out industry representatives for agrofood and food377
processing on the one hand, and for other industries on the other. We therefore assume that378
industry representatives do not represent farmers’ interests.379
Regarding projects subsidized by Water Agencies and which concern ecosystem conser-380
vation, there are no corresponding tax payers in that case, and benefits can exist for more381
than one user category. However, it is reasonable to assume that local communities and382
therefore residential water users are the most important beneficiaries of these projects. We383
therefore affect natural resource and ecosystem conservation projects to local communities.384
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample.385
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]386
There is a clear ranking of tax contributors with agriculture, industry and residential users387
in increasing order, which is also observed for subsidies from the Water Agency. However,388
subsidy decisions are correctly identified.
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ratios of subsidy over tax are fairly heterogeneous on average across user categories.389
3.3 Structural Estimation390
We consider here the special case of three categories of water users: as discussed above, in391
most water boards or agencies, water users paying taxes and receiving subsidies are residential392
users, industry and farmers. From the discussion above, it follows that a more detailed393
description of the equilibrium peaks α∗i and the median α
∗ requires more detailed information394
on the parameters of the game. We illustrate Proposition 1 through a special case which395
will prove useful in the application to French Water Agency policy, where water users can396
reasonably be grouped into three major categories (local communities, industry, agriculture).397
Consider then the case k = 3 and the simple majority game. From data presentation
above, we let γ1 < γ2 < γ3, with player 1 corresponding to agriculture, player 2 to industry,
and player 3 to residential users. As before, we denote by xi share of group i from the
bargaining game. Since player 1 is the “cheapest”, he is always in the winning coalition,
therefore his share is:
x1 =
 αγ1 + (1− α) (1− γ2) , with probability p̂1,γ1, with probability 1− p̂1.
Consider then player 2. It is included in the winning coalition by group 1 but not by
group 3:
x2 =

αγ2 + (1− α) (1− γ1) , with probability p̂2,
γ2, with probability p̂1,
αγ2, with probability p̂3.
Since player 3 is the “most expensive”, it is invited as a coalition partner by neither group
1 nor group 2:
x3 =
 αγ3 + (1− α) (1− γ1) with probability p̂3,αγ3 with probability 1− p̂3.
From the assumption on u1 it follows that V
′
1 (α) < 0 and therefore, α
∗
1 = 0.398
Results are summarized in Figure 1, and details are provided in Appendix 2.399
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]400
In the case of a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function with risk401
aversion parameter ρ,402
ui(x) =
 x
1−ρi
1−ρi for ρi > 0, ρi 6= 1,
lnx for ρi = 1,
for i = 1, 2, 3, (15)
first-order conditions (25) and (26) (see Appendix 2) can be solved explicitly for α∗2 and α
∗
3:403
α∗2 =
γ2 + γ3(
p̂2
p̂3
γ3
γ2
) 1
ρ2 γ2 + γ3
(16)
and404
α∗3 =
γ3 + γ2(
p̂3
1−p̂3
γ2
γ3
) 1
ρ3 γ3 + γ2
. (17)
Interestingly, since for CRRA utility functions u′i(0) = ∞, the two extreme cases with405
α∗ = 0 (see Figure 1) disappear, i.e., at equilibrium a positive part of the budget is al-406
ways shared according to the mechanical rule. We assume from now on that risk aversion407
parameters ρ are constant over time.408
The system of budget share equations can be written, for water user category i, river409
basin j and time period t:410
x1jt = γ1jt + pˆ1jt(1− α∗jt)(1− γ1jt − γ2jt), (18)
411
x2jt = pˆ2jt
[
α∗jtγ1jt + (1− α∗jt)(1− γ1jt)
]
+ γ2jtpˆ1jt + α
∗
jtγ2jtpˆ3jt, (19)
412
x3jt = γ3jt + (1− α∗jt) [pˆ3jt(1− γ1jt)− γ3jt] , (20)
where
α∗jt = α
∗
2jt =
(γ2jt + γ3jt)
γ3jt + γ2jt
(
pˆ2jt
pˆ3jt
× γ3jt
γ2jt
)1/ρ2j if pˆ3jtpˆ2jt < γ3jtγ2jt ,
α∗jt = α
∗
3jt =
γ3jt + γ2jt(
p̂3jt
1−p̂3jt
γ2jt
γ3jt
) 1
ρ3j γ3jt + γ2jt
if
pˆ3jt
1− pˆ3jt >
γ3jt
γ2jt
,
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and
α∗jt = 1 if
pˆ3jt
1− pˆ3jt >
γ3jt
γ2jt
>
pˆ3jt
pˆ2jt
.
From Equation (18), it can be seen that for any value of α∗, user category 1 (agriculture)413
always gains from bargaining because x1jt − γ1jt ≥ 0.414
The structural model of bargaining consists of the system of non linear equations for
subsidy shares, with probabilities pijt, tax shares γijt and risk-aversion parameter ρij on the
right-hand side. Because probabilities (that a representative of category j is a proposer) are
not observed and correspond to the subsidy internal committee, we assume that they are
related to observed political representation of water users in the RBCs. More precisely, we
specify a logit probability:
pˆijt = Prob(user i from river basin j at time t is the proposer)
415
=
exp [Wijt(βi − β1)]∑N
k=1 exp [Wkjt(βk − β1)]
, i = 1, . . . , n, (21)
where, without loss of generality, category 1 is chosen as the reference.416
The optimal parameter α∗ in river basin j at time t equals α∗2 if pˆ3/pˆ2 < γ3/γ2, equals α
∗
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if γ3/γ2 < pˆ3/(1−pˆ3) and equals 1 if γ3/γ2 ∈ [pˆ3/(1−pˆ3), p3/p2]. By replacing probabilities pˆj418
by their expression as functions of Wj, the optimal α is replaced in the structural equations419
for subsidy shares xj depending on the three conditions above (which depend on observed420
γs and W s).421
Note that we do not have enough observations to estimate our model for each river basin422
(16 years for each). Therefore, parameter estimates (β, ρ) are to be considered average423
values over years and river basins.424
The system of equations is estimated by GMM (Generalized Method of Moments), using425
γ1 and W2 as instruments. To achieve convergence, we only keep two equations for estimation426
because dependent variables (shares) sum to one. We arbitrarily drop the third equation427
(residential users), to focus on user categories agriculture and industry.428
For some river basins and years, γ1 is equal to zero because multiyear programmes did429
not have agricultural use or emission tax in their policies. To correct for this, we augment430
the set of explanatory variables with a dummy variable, equal to 1 if agricultural tax share431
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γ1 > 0 and 0 otherwise. Moreover, for some observations x1 = 0, not as a result of bargain-432
ing in RBCs, but because the water agency did not have a subsidy policy for agricultural433
projects. We include a dummy variable (see Moro and Sckokai, 1999) equal to 1 if x1 > 0434
and 0 otherwise when x1 is an explanatory variable (in the equation for x2), and we perform435
a preliminary Tobit estimation to check for the presence of a possible selection bias because436
of censored observations. Parameters associated with dummy variables as well as the pa-437
rameter on selection correction are not significant, indicating that censored observations do438
not significantly affect parameter consistency.439
If there are enough observations in all three regimes for α∗, then ρi, i = 1, 2 would be440
identified. However, in the data, γ3/γ2−W3/W2 = 0.8095/0.1799− 0.4887/0.3625 = 3.1515,441
implying that if pˆ3/pˆ2 is not too far from W3/W2, the number of observations such that442
α∗ = α∗2 would be far greater than the two other cases. We check during estimation that this443
is the case, which implies that parameter ρ3 is not identified because α
∗ is almost always444
equal to α∗2. Therefore, we consider only the case α
∗
jt = α
∗
2jt.445
To avoid possible small-sample bias because of excessive over-identification, we consider446
only two instruments for each equation, which yields two over-identifying moment restrictions447
(5 moment conditions for 3 parameters).The variance-covariance matrix of parameter esti-448
mates is computed with a heteroskedasticity-consistent robust procedure, using river basin449
as a cluster variable to construct such matrix.450
3.4 Estimation results451
We consider several specifications of the structural model, to check for robustness along452
two directions. The first one concerns the relevant proportion of RBC representatives to453
construct vector W , namely, either the full committee or only water users as a subset of the454
former. Additionally, we consider two classification possibilities for representatives of rural455
communities, namely, either with agriculture or with other local communities. Estimation456
results are in Table 2, with various specifications from Model (A) to Model (F).457
Parameter estimates are remarkably similar across model specifications, as far as β2, β3458
and ρ are concerned, but also the average estimate of α, around 0.68. All estimates are459
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significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level. Regarding the specification tests, we460
compute the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions. Associated p-values of the J-test461
are all above 5 percent, so that model specifications from (A) et (F) are not rejected. Finally,462
concerning the goodness-of-fit measures, determination coefficients are around 0.10 and 0.35463
for the agricultural and industry share equation respectively.464
Parameter estimates are used to compute the estimate of average α over river basins and465
years. We compute a Wald test for the assumption that α∗ = 0 (no predetermined part of466
budget to bargain upon) or α∗ = 1 (no bargaining), at the sample mean. The p-values of467
these test statistics are well below 0.05, so that the assumption of a single-stage game with468
full or no bargaining is strongly rejected, when α∗ is evaluated at the sample mean.469
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ]470
We compare our GMM structural parameter estimates with reduced-form estimates. To471
ease comparison, the latter are computed under a model specification as close as possible472
to the structural model, i.e., with the same explanatory variables, and a two-step GMM473
estimator with exogenous variables as instruments in the corresponding equation. To have474
a benchmark from empirical analyses of similar settings in the literature, we consider the475
work of Kauppi and Widgren (2004).476
In Kauppi and Widgren (2004), two alternative explanations of the distribution of the477
European Union (EU) budget are contrasted, with players being the state members of the478
European Union. A possible explanation called the “needs view” postulates that members’479
allocations are determined by a principle of solidarity which can be evaluated in several ways.480
Given that the bulk of budget spending is devoted to agriculture and less-favoured regions,481
Kauppi and Widgren measure the needs of EU countries by the weight of their agricultural482
production and their relative income levels. A second explanation called the “power politics483
view” considers the problem, as we do, as a divide-the-dollar bargaining game where the484
power of the player is exclusively described by his voting weight. Their results indicate that485
at least 60% of the budget expenditures can be attributed to selfish power politics and the486
remaining 40% to the declared benevolent budget policies. However, when they apply specific487
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voting power measures that allow for correlated preferences and cooperative voting patterns488
between member states, their estimates indicate that the power politics view explains as489
much as 90% of the budget shares.490
Kauppi and Widgren’s bargaining solution is borrowed from cooperative game theory,491
in contrast to ours which is based on a non-cooperative bargaining game. Kauppi and492
Widgren’s power measure is entirely based upon the voting weight, while ours also depends493
on the proposal power.494
In our case, the political view of Kauppi and Widgren can be captured by the proposition495
of members for each category in RBCs (W ). However, for the needs view, we consider instead496
the share of tax payments γi because of the principle “water pays for water” applied by Water497
Agencies, and also the fact that subsidies aim at helping water users reduce their tax burden498
paid to water Agencies. We therefore consider only W and γ as explanatory variables. This499
also has the advantage of matching exactly variables used in the structural model.500
We perform a regression analysis of the relative subsidies received by two out of the three501
main water users (agriculture and industry, because these shares sum to 1), as a function of502
relative representation in RBC and/or tax shares of each user category.503
The system of reduced-form equations is the following:504
xjit = β0 + β1jWjit + β2kWkit + β3jγjit + β4jγkit + αij + εijt, (22)
i = 1, 2, . . . , 6; t = 1, 2, . . . , T ; j, k = 1, 2 (agriculture, industry),
where xjit is the share of total subsidies received by the user category j (agriculture,505
industry) by Water Agency i at time t, Wjit and Wkit are the proportions of representatives in506
the River Basin Committee for user category j and k respectively, and γjit is the share of tax507
payments to the Water Agency paid by user category j. Unobserved heterogeneity specific508
to Water Agency i and to the user category is captured by the individual effect αij, and εijt509
is an i.i.d. random disturbance. We do not consider a fixed-effect estimation method, as the510
number of time periods is large (16), and possible correlation between unobserved individual511
effects αij and explanatory variables would lead to rejection of the model specification with512
the Hansen test anyway. The same procedure as in the structural model is used to control513
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for censored observations with x1 = 0 (see above).514
Because a significant proportion of RBC members are not likely to have a significant role515
in the discussions over the distribution of subsidies, we consider only the proportion of (agri-516
culture, industry) representatives with respect to the total number of user representatives in517
the RBC, which corresponds to specification (F) of the structural model.518
Table 3 presents estimation results by GMM of the reduced-form model, with two spe-519
cial cases: Model I with only γ as regressors, and Model II with only W as explanatory520
variables, corresponding to the needs view and the political view respectively, as in Kauppi521
and Widgren (2004). According to the Hansen over-identifying restriction test statistic, the522
specification of all three models is not rejected.523
In the complete specification of Model III, only the relative tax share of industry γ2 is524
significant and has the expected sign (respectively negative and positive in the equation for525
agriculture and industry). Model I (“needs view”) performs well with tax shares γ1 and γ2526
significantly different from 0, whereas for Model II, variables for political representation W1527
and W2 are significant in three cases out of four.528
Regarding goodness of fit, our structural model with the same number of parameters529
(β2, β3 and ρ) as Model I has a slightly lower coefficient R
2 than Model I or Model III.530
It is not possible to test directly the structural bargaining model against a reduced-form531
model, because models are not nested (namely, the structural model is not a special case of532
a reduced-form model with a particular value of parameters). For this reason, we consider a533
non-nested test which has been proposed by Hall and Pelletier (2011). This test follows the534
approach proposed by Smith (1992) and Rivers and Vuong (2002) but it is specially designed535
for GMM estimation. The test statistic is not significantly different from 0 if the pair of536
models is equivalent, and allows one to conclude in favour of the structural model if it is537
negative and significant. Because alternative specifications of the structural model produce538
very similar non-nested test outcomes, we select Model (F) from structural estimation to539
compare with reduced-form estimation results. Results of the non-nested testing procedure540
in Table 3 indicate that models are observationally equivalent at the 5 percent level, and that541
the structural model would be preferred to reduced-form Model III at the 10 percent level.542
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We therefore conclude that our structural model performs well in predicting relative subsidy543
shares, with a limited number of parameters and restrictions on the relationship between x544
and W imposed by the bargaining model.545
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]546
Finally, from the structural model parameter estimates, we compute estimated probabil-547
ities that a representative of a particular category is chosen as a proposer (pˆ). From Table 4548
reporting average proportions of representatives (W ) together with estimated probabilities,549
one can see that average pˆ and W are close for industry. However, the probability estimate550
is about twice the average proportion W for farmers, while it is lower by about one-third for551
local communities. We therefore identify an additional factor for the systematic excess ratio552
of subsidy over tax for farmers, due to the nature of the bargaining process. Farmers receive553
a larger share of subsidies than their relative contribution to total taxes, not only because554
they are often well represented in RBSs, but also because the estimated probability that a555
farmer representative is chosen as a proposer is higher.556
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]557
4 Discussion558
The bargaining model presented in this paper draws upon Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and559
is applied to represent coalition formation and sequential negotiation over an environmental560
budget in the case of water boards. With the special case of three water user categories and561
CRRA preferences of representatives in River Basin Committees, we provide a theoretical562
explanation for systematic net gains from bargaining for some user categories. Beside the563
role of political representation in River Basin Committees that may be distorted compared564
with respect to tax contributions to the total budget, the nature of the negotiation process565
is also shown to have a major role. First, some representatives of water user categories may566
be easier to invite in a coalition when negotiating over budget distribution because of their567
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lower contribution in terms of taxes. Being more often in winning coalitions with other rep-568
resentatives, these categories benefit from relatively higher subsidy-tax ratios. Second, the569
bargaining model contains two stages, i.e., negotiation over a fixed part of the budget propor-570
tional to tax contributions of each user category, and then negotiation over the distribution571
of the residual budget.572
In our empirical application to French Water Agencies over the period 1987-2007, the573
agricultural sector benefits from a systematically positive difference between subsidies and574
taxes, while for industry and residential users, such difference depends in a nontrivial way of575
user representation and the probability to be selected as a proposer of a budget distribution.576
We perform a structural estimation of the bargaining model under assumptions regarding577
players’ preferences, the distribution of representative power over water users, and the struc-578
ture of the bargaining game. Several specification tests confirm that our structural model is579
not rejected in favour of reduced-form models with either a political or a “needs” view as the580
only determinant of budget shares. Compared with reduced-form estimation, our structural581
model performs well in terms of parameter significance and goodness-of-fit. Moreover, the582
restriction that the two-stage game reduces to a single-stage game, when either full or no583
bargaining is taking place, is also rejected.584
Our results can be used to provide a better understanding of the nature of negotiation585
processes in water boards and its expected impact on budget distribution issues. In particu-586
lar, policy makers willing to reduce the asymmetry between net contributions of water users587
may either reform voting rules and user representation in committees, or modify economic588
instruments such as taxes. In the first case, a possibility would be to consider a one-stage589
game which, based on the discussion above and Figure 1 in the case of three water user590
categories, would imply either α∗ = 0 (full bargaining) or α∗ = 1 (no bargaining and subsidy591
shares proportional to relative tax payments). The bias towards a particular user category592
obviously disappears if α∗ = 1. However, if a two-stage process is maintained, such an out-593
come of the game would depend, as shown in Section 3, on the ratio of relative tax payments594
γ3/γ2 as well as on the probability that some user categories are selected as proposers, which595
may be different from the relative frequency of representatives in the committee. In the596
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second case, the bias towards agriculture in particular (player 1) coud obviously be limited597
if γ1 is increased. However, even if the cost of “buying” this category for joining a coalition598
would increase as a result, this is not enough to modify the outcome of coalition formation.599
Our bargaining model provides a simplified representation of negotiation over budget in600
river basin committees, with reasonable performance given data limitations. Deeper investi-601
gation into coalition formation and bargaining in committees, using detailed proceedings of602
committee meetings for a given river basin, is a possible extension of the present analysis.603
In addition, other environmental or land planning policies could be considered, when a sim-604
ilar bargaining process over a budget among stakeholder representatives is present (see for605
example Proost and Zaporozhets, 2013 on transportation issues).606
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Appendix 1. Proof of Proposition 1.607
Taking derivatives of V with respect to α one gets:608
V ′i (α) = −p̂iu′i
γi + (1− α) ∑
j∈N\(Si∪{i})
γj
 ∑
j∈N\(Si∪{i})
γj (23)
+ (1− p̂i − Pi)u′i(αγi)γi.
and609
V ′′i (α) = p̂iu
′′
i
γi + (1− α) ∑
j∈N\(Si∪{i})
γj
 ∑
j∈N\(Si∪{i})
γj
2 (24)
+ (1− p̂i − Pi)u′′i (αγi) (γi)2 .
Since u′′i (·) < 0 it follows from (24) that V ′′i (α) ≤ 0.610
From (23) it follows that:
V ′i (1) = u
′
i(γi)
(1− p̂i − Pi) γi − p̂i ∑
j∈N\(Si∪{i})
γj
 ,
therefore for γi ≥ γi =
p̂i
∑
j∈N\(Si∪{i}) γj
1−p̂i−Pi the function V
′
i (1) ≥ 0, and for γi ≤ γi the opposite611
inequality holds true.612
The derivative of V at α = 0 is:613
V ′i (0) = −p̂iu′i
 ∑
j∈N\Si
γj
 ∑
j∈N\(Si∪{i})
γj + (1− p̂i − Pi)u′i(0)γi.
One can check that: V ′i (0) ≤ 0 if and only if γi ≤ γi, where γi satisfies (14).614
Since u′′i ≤ 0 we can deduce that u′i(0) ≥ u′i
(∑
j∈N\Si γj
)
. Substituting this into (14) we615
prove that γ
i
≤ γi.616
Summing up, for 0 ≤ γi ≤ γi the function Vi (α) is decreasing on the whole interval [0, 1],617
for γi ≥ γi it is increasing on the whole interval, and for γ < γi < γi it has unique maximum618
on the interval [0, 1].619
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Appendix 2. Derivation of optimal α∗.620
From Proposition 1, the thresholds for group 2 are:621
γ2 =
p̂2γ3
p̂3
and
622
γ
2
=
p̂2γ3u
′
2 (γ2 + γ3)
p̂3u′2 (0)
.
Therefore, the behavior of player 2 can be described as follows:623
- for
γ3
γ2
<
p̂3
p̂2
, function V2 (α) increases on the whole interval [0, 1] and therefore α
∗
2 = 1;624
- for
p̂3
p̂2
<
γ3
γ2
<
p̂3
p̂2
u′2(0)
u′2 (γ2 + γ3)
, function V2 (α) has an inferior maximum α
∗
2 on [0, 1]625
which is defined from the equality V ′2 (α) = 0, that is,626
−p̂2u′2 (αγ2 + (1− α) (1− γ1)) γ3 + p̂3u′2(αγ2)γ2 = 0; (25)
- for
γ3
γ2
>
p̂3
p̂2
u′2(0)
u′2 (γ2 + γ3)
, function V2 (α) is decreasing on the whole interval [0, 1] and627
therefore α∗2 = 0.628
In a similar way, the thresholds on the tax share for player 3 can be expressed as follows:
γ3 =
p̂3γ2
1− p̂3 and
629
γ
3
=
p̂3γ2u
′
3 (γ2 + γ3)
(1− p̂3)u′3 (0)
.
The behavior of player 3 can be summarized as:630
- for
γ3
γ2
<
p̂3
1− p̂3
u′3 (γ2 + γ3)
u′3(0)
function V3 (α) is decreasing on the whole interval [0, 1] and631
therefore α∗3 = 0;632
- for
p̂3
1− p̂3
u′3 (γ2 + γ3)
u′3(0)
<
γ3
γ2
<
p̂3
1− p̂3 , function V3 (α) has an inferior maximum α
∗
3 on633
[0, 1] and it is defined from V ′3 (α) = 0:634
−p̂3u′3 (αγ3 + (1− α) (1− γ1)) γ2 + (1− p̂3)u′3(αγ3)γ3 = 0; (26)
- for
γ3
γ2
>
p̂3
1− p̂3 , function V3 (α) is increasing on the whole interval [0, 1] and therefore635
α∗3 = 1.636
We can identify the median voter: it is either player 2 if
γ3
γ2
>
p̂3
p̂2
or player 3 if the637
opposite inequality holds.638
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. deviation Min. Max.
Taxes paid by agriculture (percent) 1.0105 1.0098 0.0000 3.8789
Taxes paid by industry (percent) 18.3984 8.5750 8.1221 49.9213
Taxes paid by residential users (percent) 80.5910 8.4402 50.0786 90.4670
Subsidies received by agriculture (percent) 6.8219 7.2635 0.0000 35.6239
Subsidies received by industry (percent) 15.5609 12.2956 1.7166 47.8448
Subsidies received by local communities 77.6110 11.3860 50.8769 97.8370
Agricultural representatives (percent) 14.4975 3.3121 7.6923 21.21.21
Industry representatives (percent) 35.2852 5.2392 25.0000 42.5000
Residential user representatives (percent) 50.2172 4.8662 40.4762 63.8888
Notes. 96 observations. Period 1987-2007, six Water Agencies (Adour-Garonne, Artois-
Picardie, Loire-Bretagne, Rhin-Meuse, Rhoˆne-Me´diterrane´e-Corse and Seine-Normandie).
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Table 2: GMM estimation of structural equations
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
γ Lagged Lagged Lagged Lagged Current Current
W from Full RBC Users only Full RBC Users only Full RBC Users only
Rural comm.
with agriculture Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
β2 1.4930*** 1.2314*** 1.4623*** 1.2013*** 1.1659*** 1.4313***
(0.4733) (0.3769) (0.4625) (0.3643) (0.3061) (0.4058)
β3 2.2434*** 2.4813*** 2.1854*** 2.4100*** 2.8955*** 2.6345***
(0.4174) (0.4724) (0.4044) (0.4417) (0.5129) (0.4433)
ρ 0.6787*** 0.7084*** 0.6841*** 0.7077*** 0.6406** 0.5722**
(0.2240) (0.2130) (0.2256) (0.2079) (0.2760) (0.2759)
α 0.6789*** 0.6781*** 0.6804*** 0.6775*** 0.6798*** 0.6783***
(0.1689) (0.1590) (0.1684) (0.1603) (0.1856) (0.1966)
J-test χ2(2) 1.0117 1.0639 1.0067 1.0327 0.9871 0.8946
p-value (0.6030) (0.5875) (0.6045) (0.5967) (0.6104) (0.6394)
R2 for x1 0.1054 0.1083 0.1057 0.1082 0.0957 0.0966
R2 for x2 0.3743 0.3565 0.3754 0.3576 0.3587 0.3814
Obs. 90 90 90 90 96 96
Estimation method: nonlinear two-step GMM. Standard errors in parentheses are estimated
from a heteroskedasticity-consistent robust variance-covariance matrix.*, ** and ***
respectively denote parameter significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Parameter α is
estimated in a second stage from GMM estimates, and at the sample mean.
Tax shares γ are lagged in Models (A) to (D) ; W is computed from all River Basin
Committee members in Models (A), (C) and (E), and from water users ony in Models (B),
(D) and (F) ; rural communities are grouped with agricultural representatives in Models
(A), (B), (E) and (F), and grouped with other municipalities in Models (C) and (D).
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Table 3: GMM estimation of reduced-form equations
Model I Model II Model III
Dep. variable x1 x2 x1 x2 x1 x2
Intercept 0.0712*** 0.0032 -0.3198** 0.3940** -0.0561 0.0038
(0.0139) (0.0202) (0.1374) (0.1942) (0.0816) (0.0822)
γ1 1.7747** -1.8911** 1.2380 -1.1170
(0.7998) (0.7422) (1.4106) (1.0380)
γ2 -0.1394*** 0.9618*** -0.1165*** 0.9163***
(0.0413) (0.0894) (0.0421) (0.0946)
W1 1.7603*** -1.9132** 0.4144 -0.1866
(0.6023) (0.7795) (0.3491) (0.3579)
W2 0.3634** 0.1276 0.1843 0.0780
(0.1688) (0.2752) (0.1737) (0.1640)
R2 0.1417 0.5018 0.1070 0.0615 0.1856 0.5041
Hansen test χ2(2) = 2.1580 (0.3399) χ2(2) = 4.1957 (0.1227) χ2(2) =4.0410 (0.1326)
τ statistic -0.0210 (0.5184) -1.4035 (0.1604) -1.7704 (0.0767)
96 observations. Estimation method: Linear Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated from a heteroskedasticity-consistent robust
variance-covariance matrix.*, ** and *** respectively denote parameter significance at 10,
5 and 1 percent level. Instruments for Model I and Model II equations: (1, γ1, γ2, w2).
Instruments for Model III equations : (γ1, w2, γ2, w1, w1 × γ2, γ1 × γ2). τ statistic is the
non-nested test statistic for H0 : MS = MR, with p-value in parentheses (MS and MR are
structural and reduced- form models respectively).
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Table 4: Interest-group representation in River Basin Committees and estimated probabili-
ties to act as proposer
Variable Mean Std. Deviation
pˆ1 0.2775 0.0045
pˆ2 0.3930 0.0144
pˆ3 0.3294 0.0102
W1 0.1487 0.0336
W2 0.3625 0.0551
W3 0.4887 0.0509
96 observations. Estimated probabilities are assumed logit.
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Figure 1. The different cases with three players
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